Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 17

Spring 4-1-1997

HOPWOOD v. TEXAS 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj

Recommended Citation
HOPWOOD v. TEXAS 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 3 Race &
Ethnic Anc. L. Dig. 97 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol3/iss1/17

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington
and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
christensena@wlu.edu.

HOPWOOD v. TEXAS
78 F3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
I.

FACTS

Cheryl J. Hopwood, Douglas W. Carvell, Kenneth R. Elliott, and David A. Rogers applied for admission to the 1992 entering class of the University
of Texas School of Law, ("university").' All four were
white residents ofTexas and were denied admission.2
They filed suit against the university under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3The
allegations stemmed from plaintiffs' contention that
the university's admissions program discriminated
against them by giving substantial preference to less
qualified African and Mexican -American applicants.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
The university's admissions decisions were based
largely upon each applicant's Texas Index number
("TI") which was a function of the applicant's undergraduate grade point average and Law School
Aptitude Test Score.4 For administrative convenience, the university placed applicants in one of
three categories according to their TI scores: "presumptive admit," "presumptive deny," or a middle
"discretionary zone."5 The plaintiffs fell into the discretionary zone. The TI ranges used to categorize
IHopwoodv.Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996).
2
See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F Supp. 551, 567 (W.D.

Tex. 1994.) The defendant contested the ripeness of
Hopwood and Elliot's claims because neither had been
denied admission. The district court found in pretrial
motions and hearings that each had been denied admission. The defendant further challenged the standing of all
plaintiff; because none demonstrated that they would have
been granted admission absent the challenged admissions

policies. During the same pretrial hearing, the court determined that all the plaintiffs had standing because they
proved that the university's admissions process was the
cause of their injury and that a judicial order could redress3 the injury.
Title VI proscribes discrimination that violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The prohibitions against discriminatory conduct contained
in Title VI govern "program[s] or activit[ies] receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §2000(d) (1964).

resident African and Mexican-Americans for placement into the three admissions categories were lower
than for whites. 6 In addition, a special three-member subcommittee reviewed black and Mexican American candidates within the applicable "discretionary zone" separately
from whites and non-pre7
ferred minorities.

Although the district court found that aspects
of the university's affirmative action admissions program passed constitutional muster, it held that the
program's failure to compare each individual applicant with the entire pool of applicants violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." On this basis alone, the district court struck
down the 1992 admissions policy as administered
by the university, finding that it fell outside of the

narrowly tailored framework established by the
Court.9 The district court however, refused to enjoin the university from using race in admissions
decisions or to grant damages beyond the nominal
award of one-dollar. 0 The court granted declaratory
relief and ordered that the plaintiffs be allowed to
reapply without paying the administrative fees.I
Examining the admissions program through a lens
of strict scrutiny, required for racial classifications,
the district court held that the residual effects of
past discrimination in a particular component of

The University, as a recipient ofTitle VI funds, is required
to comply
with Title VI.
4
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
Sd.
6

Id. at 936. In March 1992, the presumptive TI admission score for resident whites and non-preferred minorities was 199. Mexican Americans and blacks needed
a TI of 189 to be presumptively admitted.
7Id.
8

at 937.

Hopwood, 861 F Supp. at 579.
9See United States v. Paradise,480 U.S. 149, 171
(1987). (Establishing whether race-conscious remedies are
appropriate. The Court looked at several factors including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of relief; the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant market
and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties).
1o The issue of damages is outside the scope of the
casenote. For a resolution of this issue, See Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 955-957.
SHopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.

Texas' educational system must be analyzed in the
2
context of the state's educational system as a whole.'
On this basis, the trial court expanded the analysis
from reviewing the history of discrimination within
the context of the law school alone to the context
of the totality of the educational system. In doing
so, the court determined that the broad-based remedy employed by the law school satisfied the compelling governmental interest of remedying the
present effects of past discrimination necessary to
justify the university's affirmative action program.
The district court also noted that the legacy of past
dejure discrimination within the university fostered
a campus environment hostile towards minorities.13
The district court concluded that in the context of
the university's admissions process, the benefits of a
racially and ethnically diverse student body supported the use of racial classifications. 4 The court's
reliance on the testimony of law school deans, students and professors supported its position that the
legacy of past discrimination was manifest in the
university's present malevolent reputation in the
minority community, particularly among prospective students, as a "white school" with an under-representation of minorities. The trial court, therefore,
concluded that absent the affirmative action program, the university would be unable to achieve its
compelling goal of diversity.' s
II. HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 16 The Fifth Circuit held
that the university's efforts to remedy the present
effects of past de jure discrimination must be confined to correcting its own history of discrimination
rather than discrimination by Texas or society in
general. Specifically, the court refused to recognize
the perceived effects of a hostile environment towards minorities and the university's poor reputation in the minority community as a compelling
12 See Sweatt v. Painter,339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950).
(Ordering University of Texas to admit Sweatt, an African-American to the previously all-white law school based
on the Texas educational system's discrimination against
African-Americans).
13Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572.
14Id. at 571.
Is/d
6 ,
W
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 961.
17Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265

(1978).

governmental interest. Departing from Regents of the
University of Californiav.Bakke, 17 the court also held
that achieving diversity in the university was not a
compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit held that the university's admission
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court further instructed the district court to revisit the issue of which
party bears the burden of proof regarding damages
for a proven constitutional violation.' The United
States Supreme Court declined to review this case.'9
III. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
A. REMEDIAL PURPOSE
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit employed the
heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny outlined in Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 20 to its evaluation of the

racial classifications implemented by the university.
Only when a strong basis 6xists for believing the
state actor has discriminated in the past will a court
conclude that a state entity's remedial action is necessary.2' To pass constitutional muster,the state's use
of remedial racial classifications must be 2limited
to
2
the harm caused by a specific state actor.
The Fifth Circuit applied the teachings of Croson
and its progeny, and it appropriately held that the
district court erred in allowing the university's remedial justification to lie in the racial discrimination of all public education within the State of
Texas. 3 The circuit court did not impugn the principle of applying remedial action to all discrimination cases. Instead, it limited the application of remedying past discrimination to specific state actors.
The circuit court commented that, "when one state
actor begins to justify racial preferences based upon

the actions of other state agencies, the remedial
actor's competence to determine the existence and
scope of the harm... and the appropriate reach of
the remedy is called into question."24 The circuit
court found that addressing the actions of other state
'"The appropriate standard elucidated by the Fifth
Circuit employed a burden shifting exercise whereby once

a Constitutional violation has been established by the
plaintiffs, the university must demonstrate by a prepon-

derance of the evidence that it would have rejected the
plaintiffs to the university.
'9
Hopwood v.Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
ZORichmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
21 Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.

zHopwood, 78 F.3d at 949.
23Id.

at 950.

Z4Id. at 951.

bodies would call for "boundless remedies" which
would expand beyond constitutional limits.2s
Upon reviewing the university's admissions
policy, the Fifth Circuit determined the dispositive
factors of the district court's rulings and concluded
that the university retained no present effects of past
discrimination. Despite the district court's clear determination that the university's documented history of discrimination, as well as its poor reputation
in minority communities and the perception of a
hostile environment, warranted a race-based admissions program, the Fifth Circuit found otherwise.2 6
Instead of remanding the issue to the district court
outlining the appropriate standard to determine a
factual finding, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court.2 7 Relying on Podberesky 28 the circuit court held that the university's poor reputation
was "tied solely to knowledge of the [u]niversity's
discrimination before it admittedAfrican-American
students."- It further held that "[m]ere knowledge
of historical fact is not the kind of present effect
that can justify a race-exclusive remedy.'0 0The court
further opined that, although the school once embraced institutionalized de jure discrimination in
denying admission to blacks, this practice ended in
1950 when the United States Supreme Court struck
down the law school's discriminatory admissions
program.3 ' According to the Fifth Circuit, any further discrimination ended in the 1960's.31 Based on
this reasoning, the court came to the questionable
conclusion that any present racial tension at the university was predicated on current societal discrimination unrelated to the university's past institutionalized discrimination.33
The Fifth Circuit also justified its finding that
the university was not hostile to minority students
by highlighting that African-American students con-

25Id.
26

2

Id.

1A finding is dearly erroneous when, based on the
entire evidence the reviewing court concludes with firm
conviction that the lower court's decision is completely
devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational
relationship to the supporting data. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a); United States v. US. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
394-395 (1948); Haines v. Liggett Group, Ina, 975 F.2d
81, 82 (3d Cir. 1992).
28
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 E3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994),
cert denied, 115 S.Ct. 2001 (1995).
29Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952.
30
1d.at 952.
3'Sweatt
v. Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950).
32
Hopwood, 78 F3d at 953.
378 F.3d at 953.

tinued to apply for admission despite the university's
poor reputation.34 Using this reasoning, the court
found that minority students who applied to universities with reputations of discrimination substantiated the notion that the institution did not discriminate. Effectively, the Fifth Circuit's holding
leaves room for a remedial measure only when minority applicants fail to apply for admission.
B. DIVERSITY
The Supreme Court held in Bakke that diversity is a compelling state interest.3 Despite the holding in Bakke, the Fifth Circuit held that any consideration of race or ethnicity by a university for the
purpose of achieving a diverse student body was not
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In
support of its departure from Bakke, the Fifth Circuit relied on recent Supreme Court decisions that
recognize a compelling interest in affirmative action
programs when the programs seek to remedy the
past effects of racial discrimination.3 7 However, none
of the decisions relied upon by the Fifth Circuit related to diversity specifically in the educational context.38 For example, in Croson, the Court struck
down a city race-based affirmative action policy
which required contracts to be awarded to minority
business enterprises.39 The AdarandCourt overruled
Metro Broadcastingand held that federal minority
40
set-aside radio programs must satisfy strict scrutiny.
None of these cases suggests that Bakke should be
overruled, because neither of these cases examines
the unique role of higher education, the circuit
court's heavy reliance on them is questionable.
The United States Supreme Court has held that
the educational considerations at issue in Bakke are
41
subject only to a narrow avenue ofjudicial review.
4Id.

35
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
36
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
3

11d. at 943.

38 Id.

39

Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
4 Adarand Construction v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995), (Overruling in part Metro Broadcastingv. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
41 University Of Michigan v.Ewing,474, U.S. 214, 227
(1985). (Holding that courts are not suited to evaluate
the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that
require an expert evaluation.) See alsoNote, An Evidentiary
FrameworkForDiversiyAs A Compelling InterestIn Higher
Education, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1364 (1996). (Explaining the evidentiary framework for diversity as a compelling interest in higher education).

One of the areas the Court has sought to protect is
the autonomous decisionmaking of academic institutions. 42 Freedom of decisionmaking by institutions
protects both the individual academic freedom of
teachers and students encompassed by the First
Amendment as well as the institutional academic
freedom meant to be protected by the Court in Regents of Michigan v. Ewing.43 And in Bakke, Justice
Powell discussed the four essential freedoms of a
university-"the academic freedom to decide who
may teach, what may be taught, how it is taught
and who may be admitted to study."" A university
admissions decision is an example of such an academic decision. 45 Interference in institutional academic freedom could impair individuals' freedom
to inquire, to study, and to evaluate protected intellectual pursuits
essential to the quality of higher
6
4

education.

In addition to protecting academic decision making, Justice Powell in Bakke supported the consideration of ethnicity as "one element" in a range of factors that universities may consider in achieving the
legitimate academic goal of heterogeneous student
body.47 Describing race or ethnic background as a
"plus" in an applicant's file, the Justice wrote that
individuals who receive admission as a result of their
combined qualifications, including "plus" factors,
would not unconstitutionally displace applicants
who were rejected because they were not the right
color or background.48 The "plus" applicants, however, could not insulate themselves from comparison with all other applicants. Thus, a program which
considered race or ethnicity among a host of factors
as a "plus" which might "tip the scales" in
the admis49
sions decision would be constitutional.
The district court in Hopwoodaddressed the First
Amendment concerns of the Court by deferring to
the University's decisionmaking after it heard the
testimony of deans from law schools across the country, as well as the University of Texas faculty. Based
on the evidence presented, the court concluded that,
although the university had made genuine efforts
to end discrimination, the legacy of the past had

42Universiy
43

ofMichigan, 474 U.S. at 226 n. 12 (1985).

1d.

44Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
45Note,
supra note 41, at 1365.
4
6

1d

.

4778
48
49

F.3d at 943.

1d.
1d. at 943-944.

nonetheless left residual effects that persisted in the
present. s° The district court found that without affirmative action, the university could not achieve
its goal of diversity. In fact, the minority representation at the university would have been woefully inadequate had the law school based its 1992 admissions solely on TI's without regard to race and
ethnicity.s The court acknowledged that, without
an affirmative action admissions policy, the 1992
entering class would have consisted of, at most, nine
African and eighteen Mexican -Americans. 2
The Fifth Circuit, however, adopted a different
approach. Relegating the First Amendment issue to
a footnote, the circuit court noted that the university did not have a First Amendment interest in the
context of diversity.5 3 The court then criticized Justice Powell's concept of the "plus" program and its
application under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
"plus" program was designed to allow universities
to consider ethnicity as a contributing factor towards
their goal of diversity in admissions. The Fifth Circuit determined that achieving a diverse student
body was not a compelling state interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Because Justice Powell's
argument in Bakke received only his own vote, the
Fifth Circuit held that it was not bound by Powell's
conclusion. 4 Citing Croson and Metro Broadcasting,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court
foreclosed a finding of diversity as a compelling state
interest when it stated that "there is essentially only
one compelling state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying past wrongs."5
In striking down the university's admissions process in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
use of race in admissions for diversity in higher education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection.55 The
court asserted that diversity treats minorities as a
group, rather than individuals. While the court recognized that such treatment may further remedial
purposes, the court's holding rested on the notion
that it might just as likely promote improper
racial
57
stereotypes and thus fuel racial hostility.

54Hopwood, 861
51

F. Supp. at 571.

d.

52 d.

53 Hopwood, 78

F.3d at 943 n. 25.

78 F.3d at 943 n. 25.
5
1d. at 944, (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)).
6
1 Id. at 945.
57d.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the Fifth Circuit's review of Hopwood,
a narrow application of remedial purpose limited to
the past discrimination of the remedying entity, is
the only compelling state interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny. Despite Bakke, a university's goal
of a diverse student body cannot support an admissions policy which considers race and ethnicity.The
Court's refusal to review Hopwood further strengthens the Fifth Circuit's position against using racial
classifications and racial preferences in admissions
programs. Thus, it appears that the Court is allowing the dismantling of affirmative action programs
in higher education which have taken many years
to build.
After Hopwood, affirmative action in admissions
programs for institutions of higher learning may
become defunct. The Fifth Circuit, however, left
open the possibility for affirmative action admissions
programs to be constitutional. Universities which
adopt remedial programs must make a showing that
they have a strong basis of evidence establishing discrimination and that discrimination is particularized
to the institution.58 Any programs based on findings
of past discrimination must be limited in scope and
duration in order to ensure that the relief adopted
in fact redresses the precise injury complained of,
rather than societal discrimination. s9 Therefore, a
university must exclude from its affirmative action
program applicants whose race is adequately represented, or those who have not suffered from past
discrimination. 60
Affirmative action programs with the goal of
diversity may be designed to encompass First
Amendment values in education. The functions of
a university are varied. Among them are the basic
goals of learning, including the freedom to inquire,
to study, to evaluate, and to gain new maturity and
understanding.6 Central to these roles is the goal of

58Note, supra note

59Id. at 1361.

6OId.
61
Id. at 1364.

40, at 1359.

academic freedom on both the individual and institutional levels. A university's assessment that a diverse student population is essential to these freedoms and contributes to the fulfillment of the
institution's mission should, thus, receive favorable
judicial treatment. 61 With-evidence that diversity
furthers an educational environment, courts should
continue to follow Bakke and diversity in higher
education as a compelling First Amendment interest.6
Although states will continue to amend their
affirmative action admissions programs for state institutions as a result of the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood
interpretation of the constitutional guidelines set
forth in Bakke, states will still have viable constitutional arguments for their programs. In deciding
Bakke, Justice Powell acknowledged the First
Amendment issues in reviewing admissions programs by noting that universities must have wide
discretion as to who should be admitted. The Court
will not second guess legitimate "academic" decision-making.r 4 Since Bakke, the Court has emphasized that academic decisions are subject only to a
narrow avenue of judicial review because those decisions are not readily adapted to procedural tools
of judicial or administrative decision making.65 Many
complex academic decisions, according to the Court,
require expert evaluation of cumulative information
about which the Court is ill-informed. 66 By ignoring the First Amendment implications of its decision in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit left the door open
for future challenges to its holding. Challenges that
recognize Justice Powell's concerns, and advocate
that admissions programs are legitimate and highly
subjective academic entities, may succeed in retaining well-structured affirmative action programs.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
John A. Henry, Jr.

62Id. at 1365.
3Id. at 1374.
6Id. at 1365.
65

Id.

6Id.

